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Abstract
Background: Delusion is one of the most intriguing psychopathological phenomena and its conceptualization
remains the subject of genuine debate. Claims that it is ill-defined, however, are typically grounded on essentialist
expectations that a given definition should capture the core of every instance acknowledged as delusion in the
clinical setting.
Objective: In this paper, we attempt to show the major limitations of the definition of delusion from a non-
essentialist point of view.
Method: The problem is analyzed within the framework of constructs and their translation into definitions.
Different linguistic and epistemological perspectives that do concur when one deals with psychopathological
phenomena are also considered.
Results: The ‘construct of delusion’, rather than its clinical instances, is the reference in which its definition appears
inept. Here we claim that the broad contextual and pragmatic bases that underpin the construct of delusion tend
to be either overlooked or downplayed in the quest for a satisfactory definition of this phenomenon.
Research
“Whatever is made explicit, something is
always left implicit.” Tim Thornton [1]
Introduction
Since the 16
th century, delusions have been conceptua-
lized as judgments, beliefs, or ideas that are pathologi-
cally false, erroneous, or impossible [2,3]. Currently, the
most widespread definitions of delusion still rest upon
this basis, with the addition of the external features put
forward by Karl Jaspers in the early 20
th century, which
would supposedly help us to recognize such phenom-
enon: its incorrigibility and the certainty with which it is
held. Along these lines, in the DSM-IV [4], and very
similarly in the ICD-10 [5], delusion is defined as:
“...a false personal belief [falsity] based on incorrect
inference about external reality and firmly sustained
[conviction] despite of what almost everyone else
believes and despite of what constitutes
incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to
the contrary [incorrigibility]. The belief is not one
ordinarily accepted by other members of the per-
son’s culture or sub-culture”. Authors’ brackets.
However, each of these features could be seen as a
defeasible element in the definition of delusion. Accord-
ingly, some authors emphasize that delusional state-
ments are occasionally found to be true [6-8]. For
example, someone who firmly believes they are secretly
watched by authorities, and who finds evidence of it in
every trivial fact of daily life, may be coincidently found
to be under actual investigation. Given the coincidental
character of circumstance, this belief matches empirical
truth, yet its delusional nature is still obvious. Similarly,
the literature provides ample evidence that delusions are
held with various degrees of conviction and incorrigibil-
ity [9-19]. For example, we could present a patient that
believed to have a key role in an ongoing galactic war,
but never held this belief with absolute conviction. The
same patient believed he would live for more than a
thousand years unless he committed suicide, but was
equally unsure about it. Another patient, after two years
with a persecutory delusion refractory to antipsychotics,
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false, finally yielded: “Well, I still feel as if someone was
watching me and video recording everything I do, but I
m u s ta g r e et h a tt h i si sn o tp o s s i b l e . . . t h i si sn o ta c t u a l l y
going on”. So, while the features of falsity, conviction
and incorrigibility are not singularly necessary to make a
delusion, it is also recognized that they are not sufficient
for such a diagnosis [6,9,20-22]. In this way, we note
that mystical and ideologically grounded ideas are often
false, held with conviction and incorrigibility, but at the
same time clinically viewed as non-delusional.
Indeed, although there are other refutations of the
standard definition of delusion in the literature, most
are prompted by the fact that ’falsity’, ’conviction’ and
’incorrigibility’ are neither restricted to delusional propo-
sitions nor always present in them. However, a closer
look at how these criticisms are typically formulated
suggests that they fail to recognize the different concep-
tual issues that are involved. Furthermore, they are see-
mingly embedded in an anachronistically essentialist
view of psychopathology [23]. We argue that the vagary
of the definition of delusion needs to be considered
both in a practical, as well as more strictly conceptual
level, so as to enable a non-essentialist (or at least non-
anachronistically essentialist )p e r s p e c t i v et ob ec o n s i d -
ered. We believe that unless these particulars are ade-
quately recognized and examined, it will not be possible
to develop and hold a proper conceptualization of delu-
sions that is relevant to cross-cultural clinical practice.
The perils of ambiguous criticisms
By and large, scientific definitions aim to provide the
best possible depiction of the set of objects to which a
term refers, and in this way establish a standard for
further identification of similar objects. An adequate
approach to the flaws ascribed to the definition of delu-
sion requires that both of these roles are recognized,
and also necessitates acknowledgement that these func-
tions are relatively independent from one another.
A definition may be a reliable and accurate means to
identify things that belong to a certain class of objects
and, still, may be a poor portrayal of the class to which
that object belongs. Operational definitions employed in
scientific research (and other practical purposes) often
exhibit this limitation. So, for example, an operational
definition of diabetes based upon blood glucose levels
may accurately identify individuals to treat, or to allo-
cate in a research group. On the other hand, it neglects
information basic to the understanding of diabetes such
as its pathology and clinical implications. The same is
true when depression is defined according to a score
above a certain threshold on the Hamilton Rating Scale
for Depression. Arguably, the opposite may occur as
well, and a depiction of the meaning of a certain term
often fails to provide accurate identification of how it
should be applied and/or used. Thus, while Bleuler’s
characterization of schizophrenia could be considered
compelling, it would conceivably offer poor guidance to
decision-making in some concrete clinical situations
[24].
This dissociation basically reflects the different
requirements involved in the formulation of a given
definition. In order to be informative, a scientific defini-
tion must offer a good description of the circumstances
in which a certain term is used (as narrow, wide, clear-
cut or loose as they may be). On the other hand, its uti-
lity in identifying cases that fit into this set of objects
requires that the definition be based on features that,
besides being conspicuous and objective, are also as
exclusive and as ubiquitous as possible among the mem-
bers of that class of objects. In other words, as a tool to
identify cases that pertain to a certain class, a definition
should emphasize features that establish reliable and
precise limits for that class.
Admittedly, certain classes of objects can be properly
described by means of features of this latter type, and so
both aspects of a definition can be assumed in such
situations. Nevertheless, when focusing upon a non-dis-
crete class of objects, or when a definition has eminently
evaluative underpinnings or effect(s), an indisputable
and straightforward identification of its instances is
necessary, yet often remains artifactual. In such situa-
tions, no matter how descriptively sophisticated the defi-
nitions of these classes, no single criterion can
legitimately provide a sharp distinction between cases
and non-cases. Indeed, definitions would at best be able
to reproduce the primarily fuzzy character of those
classes, and the categorization of these phenomena
would fit better within a prototypical rather than a tra-
ditional model [25]. Psychiatric disorders seemingly
belong to this sort of phenomena, as no criteria (includ-
ing criteria external and independent to their current
definitions) have yet been shown to draw zones of rarity
between one another or between them and normality
[26]. Although the work of Patil and Giordano is
attempting to substantiate valid, eidetic definitions [23],
in these situations, definitions typically describe clusters
of features that, because of their relevance, are granted a
special place in the conceptual schema. Accordingly,
such definitions often describe the prototypical case
(i.e.- the ideal case) of each class, and decisions regard-
ing other particular cases reflect their placement along a
graded continuum of similarity to these prototypes.
Since the roles of definitions depend on distinct and
often independent attributes, we posit that any criticism
that could be made to either of these roles should
require equal specificity. As previously mentioned, criti-
cism of the definition of delusion commonly identifies
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tify a case of this phenomenon [7-9]. Although this dis-
approval highlights the practical definition of delusion, a
careful inspection may suggest that this is not solely the
concern. The accuracy of that definition to distinguish
what is delusional from non-delusional is rarely (if ever)
referred to as a matter of degree - as might be expected
according to a strictly practical perspective. Further-
more, there is little mention of evidence (or even predic-
tion) that the strict implementation of the definition
would lead to a significant number of errors or dubious
clinical diagnoses. While the mis-match between the
definition and certain clinical instances of delusion has
been convincingly demonstrated on empirical grounds,
these data are typically omitted in any such criticism of
the definition. The way that these asymmetries are
usually treated seems to reflect a deeper concern about
the definition of delusion.
A more basic conceptual issue is seemingly inferred by
critics. Mainly, they appear to believe that if the identifi-
cation of delusion is sometimes hampered by its defini-
tion, this is because the definition poorly depicts how
this phenomenon is actually presented and experienced.
In other words, it is supposed that an intuitive, but
more appealing notion of delusion rivals the standard
definition, and this might be of greater psychiatric utility
in identifying delusional cases. As a consequence, these
critics nourish the expectation that unveiling such an
underlying notion of delusion would then enable us to
re-shape the definition to more accurately describe the
phenomenon and clinical event.
At this point the problems of ambiguous criticism of
the definition of delusion become apparent. As we have
seen, reliable and accurate identification of the instances
of a certain class of phenomena requires a definition to
emphasize conspicuous and objective features. These
features should allow us to draw precise limits between
one phenomenon (e.g.- delusion) and other classes of
phenomena. Thus, the accuracy of any tentative new
definition of delusion may not be guaranteed even by
the most painstaking reappraisal of our underlying view
of this phenomenon. It would also depend on whether
or not such view is committed to ideals of objectivity
and discreteness. This cannot be taken for granted. It is
conceivable that delusions are identified on a case-to-
case basis and that the overall notion of delusion merely
reflects the ‘tendency’ of various criteria to group
together. Thus, perhaps a prototypical approach is spon-
taneously and implicitly at play when we deal with delu-
sion, even if we make some essentialist assumptions
regarding its definition [23].
Unfortunately, this tends to be overlooked in most of
the approaches to the subject. Indeed, Gipps and Fulford
(2004) provide exception in recognizing that perhaps an
essential definition of delusion remains intangible - at
least according to prior conceptualizations of what an
‘essence’ of psychiatric disorder might be [9].
Of course, since the discreteness of this phenomenon
is not wholly rejected, Gipps and Fulford (2004) are
probably right when they suggest that the pursuit of the
‘actual’ meaning of the term delusion should not be pre-
maturely abandoned. However, we choose to consider
what sort of legitimate criticism to the definition could
be made (as a non-discrete class of phenomena) and we
will try to show how a non-essentialist definition of
delusions could be advanced.
The complex construct of delusion
If no clear-cut limits seem to exist between delusions
and other phenomena, then requiring a given definition
to provide clinically relevant differentiation with preci-
sion is not reasonable. Even within a non-essentialist
framework, concerns about whether the definition of
delusion adequately depicts this class of phenomena
remain genuine. If delusions are not assumed to have an
essence, our concerns here are whether a definition then
neglects important yet tacit aspects of this phenomenon.
Whereas an essentialist perspective provides a view of
delusion that is grounded to discrete features, a non-
essentialist orientationm a yr e q u i r eam o r ec o m p l e x
construal of the meaning of delusion(s) as phenomenon,
experience, and clinical event. We argue that a prag-
matic and contextually embedded hypothesis of con-
struct formation may provide a valuable framework to
understand the complex meaning of the term ‘delusion’.
Accordingly, whether or not the definition of a given
term is well established, our views upon the construct
to which it refers are affected by a variety of explicit and
implicit information. Therefore, in addition to those fea-
tures already addressed as regards the definition of delu-
sion, other elements could be incorporated into an
understanding of this phenomenon. These could include
theoretical formulations, findings of empirical studies, as
well as significant aspects learned from clinical practice
[27]. Indeed, in some situations, the relevance of these
factors could equal and/or perhaps supercede less socio-
culturally embedded features. Accordingly, both in pub-
lic and scientific language, the meaning of the term
‘delusion’ - that is, what we think delusions are - can be
seen as a changing notion. In this way, elements could
affect our views of delusion in an almost completely
implicit way. Wittgenstein’s ideas about the meaning
and the uses given to terms of language may provide us
a useful step to understand how implicit information
could be integrated to broad concepts about delusion.
To Wittgenstein, the asymmetry between the meaning
and definition of a term was clear and fundamental; the
meaning of a term is not given by those features included
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is employed. In addition, the decision as to whether the
same label should be applied to other cases would
depend on their degree of resemblance to the previously
known uses of that term, possibly engendering new refer-
ences to its meaning [28]. Learning the situations in
which a term is used is a continuous process that recog-
nizes both theoretical and practical influences. But in this
case, meaning is embedded in a much more deeply con-
textual frame of reference. Each of the complex circum-
stances in which a term is employed becomes one of its
particular meanings, as well as a distinctive ’unit’ of refer-
ence to the identification of similar cases.
Accordingly, the overall presentation of those situa-
tions (i.e.- the cases as wholes) could be as important as
any specific, defining features. But although each of the
cases in which a term is used may have constituent ele-
ments, those cases could not be described as a simple
sum of their parts. Within these wholes, relevant aspects
of our way of dealing with terms are kept implicit. This
view is in agreement with the fact that the identification
of instances of a phenomenon may take place without
the examiner’s awareness of using explicit criteria. It may
also explain why individuals are often unable to define a
phenomenon that they have correctly identified [7].
In this light, it is worthwhile to illustrate the sort of con-
textual influences that might often be neglected as regards
the characterization and definition of delusions. Since a
phenomenological approach to psychopathology gives spe-
cial attention to contextuality, it offers an excellent episte-
mological framework for the conception of language, as
described above. According to this perspective, delusions
could neither be conceived apart from other signs and
symptoms, nor from the whole clinical scenario in which
they occur. Indeed, there are aspects inherent to the situa-
tions in which delusions are (claimed to be) present, but
that are not properties of delusion itself, and these may
possibly play a role. The attunement and overall interac-
tion between the patient and the observer (or the commu-
nity), for instance, could provide a context for both
identifying delusions, and affording meaning to this term.
Taking delusion to be the detachment of an individual
from the system of relations that regulates meanings and
the use of concepts [29], a quasi-solipsism [30,31] and/or a
failure to share common sense [32], all may suggest cen-
tral elements in the identification and values important to
this term (and concept). Following these authors, we argue
that a radical rupture between an individual and the socio-
linguistic community in which they are nested (i.e.- an
interface phenomenon), is a core aspect of delusion.
Yet, while an overall impression of disconnection
between ‘the deluded’ and other individuals may be a
valuable (albeit hypothetical) construal, it does not mean
that we should disregard the role of those features
currently included in its clinical definition [33,34]. To
the contrary, departing from the standard definition of
delusion would be to err in the opposite direction. As
noted by Thornton (2006): “... that tacit knowledge is a
necessary element of scientific judgment does not under-
mine a practical use for some codifications. But it does
suggests a principled limit to the ambition to codify all
that is involved in having good judgment” [1]. Falsity,
incorrigibility, and conviction also are important to
many aspects of the term delusion; thus, they must be
allowed some equal relevance to the meaning of the
term. These features, and a detachment from common
sense may occur simultaneously, and each may exert an
independent role in certain cases and, in this way, deter-
mine distinct subsets of delusion.
It is not expected that the linguistic and epistemologi-
cal models suggested here that relate to the interperso-
nal facets of delusion should be considered to truly
‘unmask’ the phenomenon. Rather, they should be best
understood as a common-sense and spontaneous way to
deal with delusions, if not psychiatric phenomena in
general, that is complementary to the explicit and sys-
tematized way these events are approached within nat-
uralistic scientific models. There is a dialectical relation
between these perspectives, and so we pose that the
initial tension between their supposedly competing
views can be articulated in a more sophisticated and
possibly more fruitful definition of delusion.
Although ‘incomprehensibility’ is currently excluded
from the standard definition of delusion, the ability of
this construct to discriminate ‘delusion-like ideas’ and
‘true delusions’ [6] makes it relevant. It must be noted,
however, that the idea of a ‘detachment from common-
sense’ departs from the notion of incomprehensibility,
both in its Jaspersian sense, and in the non-referential
view proposed by Heinimaa [35]. The lack of attunement
between deluded individualsa n do t h e r s ,a sp r e v i o u s l y
discussed, is more broadly woven in the lived situation of
the person/patient, such that physiognomy, speech pecu-
liarities, ideo-affective coherence, overall behavior,
thought style, reactions to the observer, and so on, all
can - and likely are - critically involved. For example, the
emotional response of a patient to an odd belief she
holds may have a fundamental influence over our clinical
intuition regarding her ‘lack of attunement’ to the socio-
linguistic community. But at the same time as this
patient’s emotional response could be a recognizable fea-
ture of detachment from common-sense (as perceived by
others), our impressions of the latter could not necessa-
rily be reduced to, or explained by the former.
Conclusion
We have argued that if delusions are supposed to con-
stitute a non-discrete class of phenomena, then it is not
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allow an accurate distinction between its instances and
those of other phenomena. On the other hand, there is
legitimate concern as to whether its definition provides
adequate description and meaning of the term delusion,
even if non-essentialist assumptions prevail. In addition,
we opine that our views on delusion are amenable to
continuous change based upon new practical and theo-
retical data. Thus, a certain gap could exist between an
established definition of a term, and its ever-evolving
meaning. The current, most widespread definition of
delusion - grounded on explicit and supposedly more
objective features - possibly neglects critical aspects of
this class of phenomena.
So while the contemporary scientific approach to psy-
chopathological phenomena adopts an objective and
descriptivist attitude, part of our view on delusion is
embedded in a more linguistic and therefore different
epistemological framework. In this way, the term delu-
sion finds meaning in the situations in which it is used;
it exposes the relevance of non-analytical processes in
identification of cases by not focusing solely on the phe-
nomenon itself, but by also attending to context, as a
whole. We believe that the schism between the deluded
individual and her socio-linguistic community - widely
reported within phenomenological psychopathology - is
an implicit, but relevant element of those clinical sce-
narios in which we can identify delusions.
Finally, the expected consequences of this discussion
should by no means be taken as a prompt to urgently
change the definition of delusion, as a balance between
the benefits and limitations of any proposed definition
must be considered at all times, bearing in mind its
intended purposes and goals. Yet, we maintain that it is
important to acknowledge the complex influences over
our views of psychopathological phenomena, recognizing
how these may affect - and be affected by - clinical
expertise, and therefore should all be taken into account
so as to open rich paths for future research.
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